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A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING SAFETY CLIMATE AND CULTURE
OF COMMERCIAL AIRLINES
Dr. Sharon Glazer
Amber R. Laurel
Rangapriya Kanan Narasimhan
San Jose State University
San Jose, California
A comprehensive safety climate and safety culture framework, which can be utilized to assess various predictors and
consequences of safety climate and to assess airline’s safety culture in relation to one another, is presented. The
framework depicts a process whereby individual, group, and organizational predictor variables, through perceived
safety climate, affect first level outcomes. First level outcomes can lead to direct costs for the organization, as well
as lowered productivity. In the framework, individual and environment variables are purported to moderate the
relationship between work-related events and safety climate. Motivation is also expected to mediate the relationships
between predictors and safety climate, as well as predictors and individual level consequences. Overall,
organizational culture and environment are likely to affect safety climate and safety culture.
Introduction
To date, there is a lack of comprehensive and coherent
safety culture or safety climate frameworks (Mearns &
Flin, 2001). Studying safety climate and culture of
airlines is a difficult undertaking; therefore it is often the
case that problems are solved reactively and the focus is
on mechanics of mishap(s). Examining safety climate
and culture from an organizational psychological
perspective, however, could provide a more holistic
understanding of why and how mishaps occur, and
provide a predictive model for preventing them. The
basis of an organizational psychological perspective is
people’s perceptions of organizational processes (e.g.,
structure, selection, reward policies), which are often the
root of mishaps (Reason, 1997). Therefore, in this paper
we present a comprehensive safety climate and safety
culture framework (see Figure 1), which can be utilized
to assess various predictors and consequences of safety
climate and to assess airline’s safety culture in relation
to one another.
Conceptual Framework
Our framework is based on Lazarus and Folkman’s
(1984) transactional model for studying occupational
stress. The transactional model demonstrates that
process variables mediate the relationship between
predictors and outcomes. Safety climate is depicted
in our model as a process variable; it’s through safety
climate that predictors will affect outcomes. It
provides context for why certain consequences occur
due to work-related events.
Predictors of Safety Climate/Culture
Individual Predictors. Individual predictors are
variables that reflect characteristics of the people who
are employed in an organization and the
characteristics  of  the  jobs  in  which  they  work.  Two
individual predictors identified in our framework are
job characteristics and personal characteristics. Job
characteristics describe  attributes  of  a  job,  such  as
task involvement, job autonomy and responsibility,
skill discretion, physical demands, work hours, shift
patterns, and fatigue. Previous research has found
that organizational members contribute more in
ensuring safe operations when provided autonomy
and responsibility within their work tasks (Parkes &
Bochner, 2001), as responsibility can lead to a sense
of pride in maintaining a good safety record (von
Thaden et al., 2003). Additional characteristics of
one’s work environment include work schedules,
work hours, shift patterns, and fatigue. Research has
shown that, demanding pilot schedules leads to
fatigue and subsequent performance problems and
errors (Bourges-Bougrine et al., 1999). Finally,
physical demands reported by flight crew members,
such as inadequate cockpit design and experience of
fluctuations between hot and cold temperatures,
noise, altitude pressure, and acceleration ( e.g. Orlady
& Orlady, 1999) can have detrimental effects on
employees’ health, and subsequently, safe flight
operations (Gadd, 2002).Personal characteristics,
such  as  safety consciousness, are associated with
taking safety precautions, and low levels of safety
consciousness can lead to adverse outcomes, such as
accidents (Behn et al., 1999). Safety competence
(Gadd, 2002) has been shown to increase likelihood
of safe flight operations (Hofmann et al., 1995).
Group Predictors. Group level predictors are
classified into two subcategories: leadership and
psychosocial stressors. Previous research has found
that leadership affects the way subordinates perceive
safety (e.g. Zohar, 2002) and lack of strong
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leadership was directly related to incidents and
accidents amongst aircrews during simulator training
exercises (Kanki, 1996). Safety climate was found to
be affected by management commitment (e.g.
Wiegmann et al., 2002). Mearns et al. (2001) found
that employees’ perceptions of managements’
commitment to safety was positively correlated to
satisfaction with safety actions. Other leadership
aspects that can affect safety climate are task
orientation and goal setting (Tuttle et al., 1975), as
well as innovation or risk behaviors. Leaders are also
pivotal in monitoring safe practices (Huettig et al.,
1999) which is central to pilot decision making, and
consequent flight safety. Psychosocial stressors
consist of variables related to role behaviors and
perceptions, which entail role conflict, role overload,
role ambiguity, interpersonal relationships, and
communication. Stressors can have human and
financial costs (e.g., turnover, poor work
performance, accidents, and fatalities; Tuttle et al.,
1975). Role overload (i.e., performance pressure) has
been found to be a strong predictor of injury (e.g.
Zohar, 2000) and can lead to avoidance coping
methods (Dillenger et al., 2003). Avoidance coping
can adversely affect accident prevention, e.g.,
behavioral disengagement was chosen as the first
choice of coping strategy amongst student pilots
(Dillenger et al.). Also, Communication of safety-
related information must occur upward, as well as
downward, and must be accessible to anyone needing
it to perform well. In an aviation context, when pilots
do not engage in positive briefings with the other
crewmembers, they can be responsible for mishaps
(Dillenger et al., 2003). Without establishing a tone
for reporting safety hazards, crew members might be
reluctant to do so on their own, and may not always
communicate their observations for fear of retribution
(e.g.Behn et al., 1999), despite being cognizant of
potential safety hazards.
Organizational Predictors.  One  of  the  more
immediate work environment predictors is the
organization’s structure and resulting organizational
politics (Thompson et al., 1997), which can affect
perceived safety climate. It is possible that
organizational politics would promote job risk-
taking. Generally, research has found that probability
of taking risks is a function of the perception of risk,
appreciation of risk, likelihood of accidents/incidents,
and previous outcomes (Adams, 2003; von Thaden et
al. 2003). Some of the important human resource
predictors affecting safety climate are preparation
and planning, training, reporting system and
rewards. Preparation and planning is required for
safe flight operations and it has been estimated that
over 100 hours of preparation are spent on each hour
of flight (Sternstein & Gold, 1991). Thus, the extent
to which Dispatch promotes safety as a priority
consideration over financial gain might have an effect
on people’s perceptions of safety climate. Also,
training efforts by an airline’s management will
affect perceived safety climate. An example is Crew
Resource Management (CRM) training, developed in
1979, after human error was identified as the primary
cause of many air transport accidents. One of the
major  emphases  in  CRM  is  communication  of
concerns, or reporting possible problems and
incidents. One way airline employees are able to
voice concerns is through reporting systems, such as
NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).
ASRS can also be utilized for research purposes
(Reynard et al., 1986) to determine safety issues and
to generate safety recommendations that could
eventually be implemented into FAA policies
targeted towards improving safety (e.g., Burian &
Barshi, 2003). Again, fear of retribution prevents
people from using it (Behn et al., 1999). Reward
systems that promote safety behavior and help to
correct unsafe behaviors in an organization are
needed in order to ensure a positive perception of
safety climate (von Thaden et al., 2003)
Mediator and Moderators
Motivation is presented as an intermediary process
variable that mediates the effects of predictors on
individual (first-level) outcomes. The extent to which
the stated goals are aligned with actual goals an
organization is trying to reach will act as a motivator
for employees to achieve the goals (Adams, 2003).
Enacting stated goals for safety, thus, would likely
enhance organizational safety outcomes (e.g. Griffin
& Neal, 2000). According to Tuttle et al. (1975), one
way to motivate employees is through performance
relevant and immediate feedback, which positively
affects employees’ safety performance (Griffin &
Neal, 2000). Thus, our framework demonstrates that
the effects of various predictors, such as training, will
likely affect individual outcomes, such as transfer of
training, through people’s motivation to achieve
valued organizational outcomes, such as reduced
incidents and increased well-being.
Person Moderators. Our framework postulates that
certain personality and demographic variables, such
as locus of control (Rochlin, 1999), propensity for
risk-taking (e.g. Nicholson, 2001) and education, can
moderate the relationship between safety climate
predictors and safety climate outcomes.
Environment Moderators. Environment moderators
identified in our framework include feedback, peer
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cohesion, group size, and support for safety by
organizational members (i.e., management, co-
worker, supervisor, and self). Previous research (e.g.,
Zacharatoset al., in press) has shown that feedback,
peer cohesion, and support for safety are important
variables that might affect safety climate in the
aviation industry. Karasek and Thorell (1990) have
found that job-decision latitude is associated with
better work performance, positive employee attitudes,
and physical and psychological well-being, whereas
the opposite occurs with little decision latitude.
Sadly, with increased automation, pilots sometimes
see the automated flight information as a better
decision-maker than themselves. Skitka et al. (1999)
found that aircrews in automated conditions tended to
engage in less discussion before arriving at decisions
due to over-reliance on the automated systems. Peer
cohesion is another potential moderator of the
relationship between predictors and perceived safety
climate (Simard & Marchad, 1994) and safety
performance (Zacharatos et al., in press). However,
excessive group cohesion may also lead to
groupthink,  which  is  a  possible  bottleneck  to  safety
(Nicholson, 2001). Large, bureaucratic groups with
dominating leaders are often reasons cited for
groupthink. Thus, group size is a variable that might
affect perceived safety climate. Another potential
moderator present in the work environment is support
for safety and it is important for organizations,
including supervisors (Thompson et al., 1997),
management, and colleagues (Fogarty, 2003;
Goldman et al., 1991) to support safety initiatives.
Outcomes of Safety Climate.
Behavioral Outcomes. Behavioral outcomes often
lead to organizational outcomes, such as accidents.
One way to prevent accidents is to ensure safety
compliance and minimize risky behaviors (Neal et
al., 2000; Reason, 1997). A positive climate for
safety will increase safety compliance among
employees (Neal et al., 2000). Although the FAA
imposes penalties for non-compliance with safety
issues;  if  pay  or  other  rewards  are  based  on
performance, such as on-time departures or
expediting check-in, then workers might feel
pressured to focus more on speed of task execution
than safety task performance (Kaminski, 1997;
Thompson et al., 1997). Because relatively few
consequences are associated with inconsistent
adherence to safety standards, even in the aviation
industry  (Thaden  et  al.,  2003),  risks  are  taken  at  the
expense of passengers, crewmembers, and people in
line  of  the  flight  path.  Thus,  poor  safety  climate
would result in increased violations and errors
(Fogarty & Neal, 2002). Violations can be prevented
through safety participation (e.g. Goldman et al.,
1991; Neal et al., 2000) and by developing safety
promoting events, such as safety meetings that
increase safety participation. Safety meetings are
supposed to take place among crew members before
flights,  in  terms  of  coordinating  roles.  Lack  of  crew
coordination is often attributed to crew errors
(Aviation Today, 2000). Unfortunately, quality of
crew coordination has declined post 9/11/2001, due
to new “safety” procedures (Chute, 2002).
Attitudinal Outcomes. Safety climate is expected to
affect people’s attitudes, and subsequently
organizational outcomes. For example, it has been
noted that apathy or a bold attitude can lead to
violations of safe operations and increase risk-taking
(Hofmann et al., 1995). Moreover, apathy might be a
result of employees becoming desensitized to safe
operations over time and transferring responsibility
of safety to others (Hofmann et al.,  1995).  That is,  a
poor safety climate might lead to apathetic attitudes.
Also, organizational commitment (e.g. Parkes &
Bochner, 2001), turnover intention, anxiety/frus-
tration, tension, complacency, organizational/job
satisfaction, safety satisfaction, and morale will be
affected by perceived safety climate. In turn, these
attitudes are expected to affect organizational safety
outcomes. Furthermore, organizational workplace
characteristics, such as communication, recognition,
safety, coworkers, and feedback lead to high morale,
which in turn, lead to job satisfaction and
commitment (Fogarty, 2003). Dunbar (2001) found
the extent to which employees felt management was
committed to workers’ welfare and helped employees
feel safe was predictive of employees’ reported
satisfaction with safety in the workplace. However,
with low commitment, low satisfaction, and poor
safety, airline employees might report experiencing
tension. When safety climate is perceived to be poor
tension might result (Eiff & Mattson, 1998).
Cognitive Outcomes. Previous research found that
exposure to informal or formal safety training and
experience of incidents or accidents influences an
individual’s appraisal of potential threatening
situations (Goldberg et al., 1991). Furthermore,
repetition of tasks leads to the ability to perform tasks
with little conscious thinking regarding the steps
involved (Hofmann et al., 1995), however, task
performance is still subject to slips and errors
(Reason, 1997). Slips or lapses are a type of cognitive
error that occur due to an individuals’ dependence on
memory to carry out a known task, however, the
individual may depend on a wrong preexisting
schema to guide execution (Hofmann et al., 1995;
Reason, 1997). Therefore, in order to reduce errors, it
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is crucial to investigate cognitive factors (i.e., risk or
situational awareness,) that result from predictors of
safety climate and perceived safety climate. Safety
research should also focus on sources of risk and
deviations from standards (Rochlin, 1999), which are
influenced by emphasis placed on representation,
perception, or interpretation of risk (Krimsky &
Golding, 1992) within an organization. In the
aviation industry, pilots are referred to as risk
managers to illustrate that managing risk is part of
achieving goals in flight (Lofaro & Smith, 1999).
Prevention of accidents can be accomplished by
making sure that risk managers comprehend the
gravity of risk and have the competencies for
managing risks, as precursors to risk reduction (e.g.
Adams, 2003). One way to ensure competencies is
through reinforcement of one’s knowledge of
regulations and ensuring that off-the-job training is
transferred on-the-job
Organization Outcomes. Organizational outcomes of
safety culture and climate include attrition, accident
and incident rates, reputation of safety, and employee
well-being and health. The main emphasis of the
aviation industry is accident prevention and a “no
accident” record. Safety climate predictors, such as
policies, procedures, training, and leadership (e.g.,
Barling et al., 2002; Burian & Barshi, 2003; Zohar,
2000), and mediators such as safety compliance and
motivation (e.g., Holling, 1999) help prevent adverse
outcomes (i.e., accidents, incidents, and injuries). The
occurrence rate of adverse outcomes (e.g., accident
rate, number of delays) can provide a measure for
demonstrating the effectiveness of various safety
climate predictors. In addition to physical outcomes,
other social outcomes, such as a positive reputation is
indicative of a positive safety culture (Schneider et
al., 1994). Attrition is another organizational outcome
that is influenced by climate predictors, such as the
selection system of an organization. Previous
research has found that mismatch of organizational
and employee values, and the quality of information
provided to applicants affect attrition rates (e.g.
Schneider & Schneider, 1994).
Conclusion
Safety is one of the greatest demands placed on
commercial airlines. However, it is not enough to
have locked cockpits or to have checklists to ensure
all safety procedures are followed. Airline employees
must adopt a mindset for safety that ensures both
procedural and common sense safety. Eiff was noted
as stating, “aviation industry has been woefully
negligent in addressing work-related hazards. This
fact is underscored by recent exploding lost-time
injury and disability claims in most aviation
organizations. Increased operational tempos coupled
with challenges in providing adequate staffing and
equipment have generated environments rich in
injury potentials” (Aviation Today, 2001, p. 3).
Maintaining a safety climate is one strategy for
thwarting injuries. The proposed framework
exemplifies variables that might relate to perceived
safety climate. Our purpose was to introduce aviation
researchers to possible antecedents and consequences
of  safety  climate.  We  do  not  recommend  trying  to
study  all  these  variables  in  one  study  but  to  study
some of these variables in more simplistic models
that address salient concerns.
This framework is an inclusive guide researchers and
aviation practitioners can use for determining
variables relevant to assessing safety climate and
culture. Eventually, results of empirical research
based on the framework can be molded into a tool for
benchmarking safety standards across airlines.
Identification of key variables related to safety
culture and safety climate can enable aviation
executives and safety officials to take preventative,
instead of reactive, measures to enhance
organizational processes that ultimately affect safety
behaviors and ensure the safety and security of the
flying public.
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